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There is apparently growing, widespread demand among
nations to convene a new international conference on the law of
the sea in order to review and perhaps amend many of the
provisions of the four conventions adopted at the International
Conference on the Law of the Sea held in Geneva in 1958
concerning the High Seas,1 the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, the Contenental Shelf" and Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas. 4 For example, when
considering the matter of a regime for the peaceful uses of the
seafloor beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, the General
Assembly, at its last session in January 1970, adopted a resolution
going far beyond questions concerning the resources of the ocean
floor, in which it:
Requests the Secretary-General to ascertain the views of
Member States on the desirability of convening at an early
date a conference on the law of the sea to review the regimes
of the high seas, the continental shelf, the territorial sea and
contiguous zone, fishing and conservation of the living
resources of the high seas, particularly in order to arrive at a
clear, precise and internationally accepted definition of the area
of the sea-bed and ocean floor which lies beyond [the limits of]
national jurisdiction, in the light of the international regime to
be established for that area. 5
* Professor of Oceanography and Director, Institute of Marine Resources, University
of California at San Diego.
1. Convention on the High Seas, April 29, 1958, in force Sept. 30, 1962, 13 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200,45 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as High Seas Convention].
2. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, April 29, 1958, in
force Sept. 10, 1964, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter cited
as Territorial Sea Convention].
3. Convention on the Continental Shelf, April 29, 1958, in force June 10, 1964, 15
U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 [hereinafter cited as Continental Shelf
Convention].
4. Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas,
April 29, 1950, in force March 20, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A-S. No. 5969, 559 U.N.T.S.
285 [hereinafter cited as Fishing Convention].
5. U.N. Doc. A/RES/2574 (XXIV), 15 Jan. 1970.
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This was passed as an amendment to a resolution originally
introduced by Malta, calling for an international conference to
deal only with problems concerning the limits of national
jurisdiction over the seabed. Despite opposition by the United
States, and a number of other nations, to a conference with such
broad terms of reference the resolution was adopted by a large
majority in the General Assembly, 65 to 12 with 30 abstentions.'
Although opposed to a conference of such broad compass,
the United States would apparently welcome an international
conference of more limited scope, especially to deal with
important problems left unresolved by the Geneva Conferences in
1958 and 1960, as has been indicated by a recent speech of John
R. Stevenson, Legal Advisor to the Department of State. Mr.
Stevenson particularly referred to the need for some uniform
agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and of an exclusive
fishing zone, noting, however, the effect of a broad territorial sea
(12 miles) on freedom of navigation, especially in important
international straits.7 He also referred specifically to the problem
of fishing on the high seas in areas contiguous to coastal States;
he noted that this problem has become greatly exacerbated by the
development of large and mobile high seas fleets that can move
in on an area, seriously overfish the stocks, and move on, resulting
in economic dislocations in a coastal State, or a region thereof,
which is dependent on such fisheries for its livelihood.8
It is evident that the provisions of the Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, and
the provisions concerning fishing in the other 1958 Conventions,
do not provide .a completely satisfactory basis for resolving some
international fishery problems. This is shown not only by the
demand for a new conference, but also from the recent practices
of nations in dealing with fisheries claims and disputes, outside of,
or beyond, the provisions of the 1958 Conventions.
I shall review the pertinent background to the 1958
conventions, as they concern fisheries, and review their provisions
6. 24th General Assembly, Verbatim Record of Dec. 15, 1969.
7. Stevenson, InternationalLaw and the Oceans, Address Before the Philadelphia
World Affairs Council and the Philadelphia Bar Association, 18 February 1970, Dep't of
State Press Release No. 49, 18 Feb. 1970, 3-4, LXII DP'r STATE BULL. 339, 340.41
(1970) [hereinafter cited as Stevenson].

8. Id. at 4-5, LXII

DEP'T STATE BULL.

at 341.

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

in relation to recent activities of nations in international fishery
affairs, with particular emphasis on practice and policy of the

United States.
BACKGROUND To THE 1958 CONVENTIONS

The International Law Commission, 9 commenting on its
preparatory work culminating in the final draft articles of a
Convention on the Law of the Sea, prepared at its Eighth Session
in 1956, noted that, when it was first set up, it was thought that
its work might have two different aspects: On the one hand the
codification of international law, and on the other hand the
progressive development of international law, that is, the
preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet
been regulated by international law, or in regard to which the law
has not yet been sufficiently developed in the practice of States.
The Commission noted that, in preparing its rules on the law of
the sea, it became convinced that, in this domain at any rate, the
distinction between these two activities can hardly be maintained.
Consequently, the Commission did not attempt to specify which
of its draft articles fell into one or the other category. However,
it seems quite evident that much of the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, both as
drafted by the Commission and as finally adopted by the 1958
Conference, falls into the category of progressive development. To
quote Professor D.M. Johnson:
The traditional doctrinal international law of the sea grew
without any clear reference to the actual and potential
functions that can be exercised in the sea, and it has provided
little or no guide for the resolution of most contemporary
fishery conflicts. The lack of coherent and authoritative
decisions has left international tribunals without a clear sense
of the underlying principles of fishery law."0
He further writes:
International law, like domestic law, is built up partly by the
adjudication of disputes between competing interests .

. .

. In

international litigation there is an embarassingly thin stock of
9. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 11 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 9, U.N. Doc. A/3159 (1956)
[hereinafter cited as I LC, 8th Session].
10. D. M. JOHNSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 111 (1965) (footnotes
omitted).
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principle available to the courts, in the absence of a universal
code, but at the 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea some
success was achieved in supplying this deficiency through
'progressive development'.,
Although the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the
Living Resources of the High Seas was adopted by a two-thirds
majority at the 1958 Conference, it has since been ratified by only
27 nations, and notably lacks ratification by important major
fishing nations and maritime powers, some of the reasons for
which I will discuss below. Consequently, the practical
effectiveness of this Convention, although it has provided a
workable definition of "conservation," and a codification of the
rights and duties of States in relation thereto, on which nations
generally rely in their negotiations over international fishery
disputes, has been less than might have been hoped.
An important difficulty with the 1958 Conventions, with
respect to international fisheries affairs, is that they do not deal
fully with the four important policy problems concerning marine
resources, that, following McDougal and Burke," may be listed
as follows:
(1) What, if any, limitations on the use of the resources are
desirable?
(2) Who ought to be permitted access to these resources on
the high seas?
(3) Who ought to be permitted to prescribe and apply
policies regarding limitation on access, if such limitations are
desirable?
(4) How should disputes regarding prescription and
application be resolved?
With respect td the first problem, it was fairly easy to achieve
agreement on the desirability of limitation of use, for purposes of
conservation, of those living resources that are heavily exploited,
conservation being defined as "the aggregate of the measures
rendering possible the optimum sustainable yield from those
11. Id. at 113. See also E.N. Oribe in The Geneva Convention-Ten Years Later,
PROC. THIRD ANN. CONF. LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 64-66 (1969).
12. M. McDOUGAL & V. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 927 (1962)

[hereinafter cited as McDOUGAL & BURKE 1962].
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resources so as to secure a maximum supply of food and other
marine products.' 3 Although some economists and politicans are
not fully satisfied with this definition, believing that even further
limitations on fishing are desirable to increase net economic yield
or social welfare, it has been, and continues to be, a useful
standard. Agreement as to the duties, and rights, of States in
relation to the adoption of measures for purely conservation
purposes also presented no great difficulty.
The third problem was also dealt with in detail in the
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas. The special interests of the coastal State in the
conservation of the living resources of the high seas adjacent to
its territorial sea is recognized, as well as the rights and interests
of distant-water fishing nations. This Convention sets forth the
duties of States engaged in high seas fisheries to adopt, and
cooperate with other States in adopting, necessary conservation
measures, provides for participation of the coastal State in
conservation management of the living resources of the high seas
off its coast, whether or not its nationals are actually engaged in
the fishery, and also provides that, in cases of necessity, under
stipulated criteria, the coastal State may adopt unilateral
conservation measures.
Respecting the fourth problem, this Convention provides a
detailed procedure for the settlement of disputes concerning the
necessity and validity of conservation measures (that should not
discriminate in form or in fact among fishermen of different
States on the high seas), through negotiations among the nations
concerned, and, failing such negotiated solution, provides for
compulsory, binding arbitration.
The important problem that the 1958 Conventions failed to
deal with in a satisfactory manner is the second on the above list;
that is, within the limitation of the maximum sustainable yield,
who gets the fish? In the first place, of course, there was failure
to agree on where the territorial sea, or an exclusive fishing zone,
ends and the high seas begin. Beyond that, however, many nations
appear to be dissatisfied with complete freedom of access to the
living resources on the high seas by all nations on an equal
footing, many believing that the coastal State 9hould, in at least
some circumstances, have a priority right to a share of the catch.
13. Fishing Convention, supra note 4, Art. 2.
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The difficulty of allocation of priority of access is clearly
expressed in the commentary of Iceland on the draft articles of
the International Law Commission adopted at its Eighth Session,
in which it is stated:
At first there seemed to be a tendency within the Commission
to ignore or at least to deal very unrealistically with the
problem of jurisdiction over fisheries. The Commission in
those earlier stages seemed to think that the problem of
jurisdiction over fisheries could be solved by, on the one hand,
the exclusive rights of the coastal State within its territorial sea
and, on the other, the adoption of articles concerning
conservation measures on the high seas which would be equally
binding to all nations fishing in a given area. . . . Of course
it is necessary and to everyone's benefit to insure the maximum
yield of the fish stocks both within and outside the territorial
sea. But what if the requirements of the coastal State and other
States in the coastal area are not satisfied by the maximum
yield? 4
And, further,
a fundamental distinction must, as already stated, be
made between two different things. On the one hand there is
the problem of conservation of the fish stocks. From a
scientific point of view there seems to be pretty common
agreement as to what measures are required to insure the
maximum sustainable yield. Theoretically, such measures
could be taken either unilaterally or through international
agreements with exactly the same effect. . . . The other
problem to which I referred relates to the situation where, in
spite of adequate measures to sustain the maximum sustainable
yield, that maximum yield is not sufficient to satisfy the
requirements of all those who are interested in fishing in a
given coastal area. In that case . . . we maintain that the
proper solution is not to take some arbitrary number of miles
. . . and say that within that area the coastal State has
priority but outside it the situation is the same for all ...
The different coastal areas are so variable that it is neither
reasonable nor realistic to put them all in the same
straightjacket and our contention is . . . that each coastal
State should itself determine its fishery limits on the basis of
all relevant considerations. The standard objection against this
14. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 3 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 13/5, at
42, and Add. 1-4, at 87 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Conference Official Records].
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proposition is that such a formula would lend itself to abuse
so that excessive demands would be made even in the absence
of any real need. From that point of view it has been suggested
that some arbitral body should be empowered to make the
final decision. 5
A major obstacle in dealing with this sort of problem at the
1958 Conference was the apparent impossibility of arriving at any
generally acceptable set of criteria as to who should have what
priorities respecting access to the resource when the total harvest
thereof is limited. I doubt whether this difficulty has been much
ameliorated since then.
In the period immediately following World War II, it became
generally evident that the law of the sea was an important subject,
ripe for codification and some progressive development. The rapid
recovery and growth of the industrialized sea fisheries following
the war, and the growing conflicts between distant water fishing
nations and coastal States was an important stimulus. At its first
session in 1949, the International Law Commission had
commenced to study the question of the regime of the high seas
and, at about this same time, various fisheries questions had
become matters of considerable importance among several
members of the United Nations, and were being vigorously
debated in the General Assembly and Committees thereof. The
International Law Commission continued its efforts, and, at its
fifth session in 1953, produced drafts of suggested articles for an
international convention covering the continental shelf, fisheries
resources of the high seas and the contiguous zone.'
In this document, the Commission adopted three draft
articles covering the basic aspects of the international regulation
of fisheries . 7 The first of these articles deals with the problem of
conservation, setting forth the right of a State to regulate and
control fishing activities in areas of the high seas, where nationals
of other States are not thus engaged, to protect the resources
against waste or extermination; providing for such regulation by
agreement where more than one State is concerned; and referring
disputes thereover to an international authority. The second
15.
16.
A/2456
17.

Id. at 88-89.
Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9 (Ch. III, at 12), U.N. Doc.
(1953).
Id. at 17.

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

article deals with the special rights of the coastal State, and
provides that "[iln any area situated within one hundred miles
from the territorial sea, the coastal State or States are entitled to
take part on an equal footing in any system of regulation, even
though their nationals do not carry on fishing in the area."' 8 The
third article would establish an international authority, to be
created within the framework of the United Nations, that would
be able to prescribe regulations essential for protecting the fishing
resources of any area of the high seas against waste or
extermination, and providing that States would be bound by the
findings of such an authority.
The Commission noted, however, that there was considerable
opposition on the part of many nations to this third article, on
the ground that there was no real need for the creation of an
international authority, since fisheries could be regulated, as in the
past, by means of agreements between States. The Commission
went on to observe 9 that, while the articles adopted contain the
general principles, only a detailed convention or conventions could
translate them into a system of working rules, and that it is
probable that that object may be achieved on a regional basis
rather than by way of a general convention, noting that
conventions concluded in the past for the protection of fisheries
had been, as a rule, on a regional basis. Since this involved
matters of a technical character, the Commission found it outside
its competence, and suggested that the General Assembly should
enter into consultation with the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) with a view to investigating the matter, and
preparing drafts of a convention. or conventions on the subject, in
conformity with the general principles embodied in the draft
articles.
In this report on its Fifth Session, the Commission also
explained that, with respect to the continental shelf, it had referred
to its "natural resources" rather than "mineral resources" in
order to encompass as resources of the shelf the products of
sedentary fisheries, in particular to the extent that they are natural
resources permanently attached to the bed of the sea. It stated that
"[i]t is clearly understood, however, that the rights in question do
not cover so-called bottom-fish and other fish which, although
18. Id.

19. Id. at 18-19.

19701

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

living in the sea, occasionally have their habitat at the bottom of
the sea or are bred there.""0
The same commentary is repeated in connection with the
2
final draft articles prepared by the ILC at its Eighth Session. 1
The question of just which living resources pertain to the shelf and
which to the superjacent high seas was, however, to become a
matter of considerable contention at the 1958 Conference, and still
remains a matter of considerable contention and conflict.
In accordance with the recommendation of the ILC, the
General Assembly in 1954 requested the Secretary-General to
convene an international technical conference at the headquarters
of FAO to study the problem of international conservation of the
living resources of the sea, and to make appropriate scientific and
technical recommendations. Pursuant to this resolution,2 2 an
International Technical Conference on the Conservation of the
Living Resources of the Sea was held in Rome from 18 April to
10 May, 1955, attended by representatives of 45 nations.
Background papers had been previously prepared by invited
experts and were circulated to participants.2 3 After extensive
discussions, the Conference arrived at a number of very important
24
conclusions and recommendations, incorporated in its report.
Among these were an agreed definition of "conservation of the
living resources of the high seas"; recognition of the special
interests of the coastal State in maintaining the productivity of
resources of the high seas near its coast; the need for specific types
of scientific information required as a basis for any fishery
conservation program; a review of the principles of successful
international conservation organization; and considerations of the
applicability of existing types of international conservation
measures and procedures to other international fishery
conservation problems. In connection with the last topic, the
Conference concluded that:
The present system of international fishery regulation
(conservation measures) is generally based on the geographical
20. Id. at 14.
21. ILC, 8th Session supra note 9, at 42.
22. G.A. Res. 900,9 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 51, U.N. Doc. A/2890 (1954).
23. Papers presented at the InternationalTechnical Conference on the Conservation
of the Living Resources of the Sea, 11 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doe. A/Conf. 10/7 (1956).
24. Report of the International Conference on the Conservation of the Living
Resources of the Sea, 10 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 10/6 (1955).
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and biological distribution of the marine populations with
which individual agreements are concerned. From the scientific
and technical point of view this seems, in general, to be the best
way to handle these problems. This sytem is based upon
conventions signed by the nations concerned.,
The report of the Conference advocated a number of guiding
principles in the formulation of such regional conventions, and
pointed out that the conventions, and the regulatory measures
taken thereunder, should be adopted by agreement among all
interested nations (including the coastal States). It further noted
the possibility of disagreements, both as to the need for
conservation measures and the nature of such measures, and
possible refusal on the part of other States to observe such
measures. It was suggested that a-solution to such problems might
be found through agreement among States to refer disputes to
qualified expert arbitrators. The Conference also recognized the
serious problem that is created when intensive exploitation of
offshore waters adjoining heavily fished inshore waters
considerably affects the abundance of fish in the latter, and there
has not yet been established a conservation system involving all
of the concerned States. The responsibility and authority of the
coastal State under these circumstances, pending negotiation of
suitable arrangements, was extensively debated but no agreement
was reached.
In the light of the report of this Rome Conference, the
International Law Commission at its Eighth Session rather
thoroughly revised its draft articles concerning the conservation of
the living resources of the high seas. 26 These draft articles
incorporated the definition of conservation recommended by the
Rome Conference, set forth the rights and duties of users of the
living resources of the high seas respecting the conservation
management thereof, and set forth the special interests of the
coastal State in the conservation of the living resources in the high
seas adjacent to its territorial sea, and its right to participate in
any system of research and regulation in such an area. The coastal
State would also be given authority to adopt unilateral measures
of conservation, failing a negotiated agreement with other States,
when there is an urgent need for measures of conservation, the
25. Id. at 9.
26. ILC, 8th Session, supra note 9, at 32-38.
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proposed measures are based on appropriate scientific findings,
and do not discriminate against foreign fishermen. Additional
articles provide for settlement of disputes by agreement among the
States concerned but, failing that, provide for compulsory
arbitration.
These draft articles were substantially adopted, in the
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas at Geneva in 1958, with some improvements in
drafting and added precise time periods for various actions in
connection with the arbitration provisions, after extensive debate
both in the Third Committee and in the Plenary Meetings. The
interest of the coastal State was further strengthened by additional
27
paragraphs concerning the priority of its fishing regulations.
This Convention obviously went far beyond the previous
customary law in giving to coastal States large powers of
regulation of fisheries in the high seas off their coasts for
conservation purposes. It was recognized that such powers could
easily be abused 5 and that, in consequence, the noncoastal State
must have a guarantee of some suitable means of settling disputes
equitably. Thus, the compulsory arbitration provisions of the
Convention became an essential component of a "package deal,"29
failing which the Convention could not have been adopted.
However, the Soviet Union, and other members of the Soviet
bloc, were adamantly opposed to compulsory arbitration, and
strongly opposed it both in the Third Committee"0 and in the
Plenary Meetings.3 1 But these aspects of the Convention were so
mutually necessary that they could not even be voted on
separately. Consequently, despite opposition of the Soviet bloc, all
of the proposed fisheries articles, with one exception, were voted
on, and adopted, en bloc. 3 2 Before voting on the articles
27. Fishing Convention, supra note 4, Art. 6.
28. Conference Official Records, supra note 14, at 88-89.
29. See commentary by McDOUGAL & BURKE 1962, supra note 12, at 996.
30. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
13/41 (1958) at 75, 77.
31. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
13/38 (1958) at 43, 44.
32. Id. at 43-47. The single exception was a proposed article that would give
preferential fishing rights to the coastal State, when it is necessary to limit the catch and
the people of the coastal State are overwhelmingly dependent on the coastal fisheries for
their livelihood or economic development. This proposal, voted on separately, was
defeated.
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themselves, there was considered the matter of whether nations in
signing the Convention might be allowed reservations to any of
the provisions; Germany had proposed that no reservations be
allowed to the fishery articles. 3 This proposal failed to muster a
two-thirds majority. The articles as a whole were then adopted by
a vote of 44 to 16 with 8 abstentions. However, at a later Plenary
Session, dealing with reservation clauses in all of the Conventions,
it was decided, by a majority of 49 to 13 with 10 abstentions, that
no reservations would be allowed to those articles that became
Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of this Convention, dealing with
the special interest of the coastal State and with the procedure for
34
settlement of disputes, including compulsory arbitrartion.
It is easy to see why this Convention has received so few
ratifications by important fishing nations, having been ratified
through October 1968 by only the following nations with
substantial sea fisheries: Australia, Mexico, Portugal, South
Africa, United Kingdom and United States.3 5 Some nations, such
as the USSR, are opposed to compulsory settlement of disputes.
Others are opposed to the encouragement of exclusive and
preferential rights of coastal States. This Convention remains,
therefore, largely a statement of principles, rather than an active
mechanism for achieving conservation of fishery resources.
The ILC had taken note of proposals for claims to exclusive
fishing rights on the basis of special economic circumstances,
where a nation is primarily dependent on the coastal fisheries for
its livelihood, and also had taken note of the "principle of
abstention" as perhaps reflecting problems that deserve
recognition in international law, but had declined to deal with
them because of their technical character.3 6 There was no
agreement on these matters at the 1958 Conference, despite
extensive debate.
While there was considerable sympathy for according some
priority to coastal States, such as Iceland, which were really
overwhelmingly dependent upon the fishery resources of their
adjacent seas, it proved impossible to arrive at any adequate
33. Id. at 46.
34. Id. at 58.
35. Informal tabulation by U.S. State Department, Office of Special Assistant to the
Secretary for Fisheries & Wildlife, 8 Oct. 1968.
36. ILC, 8th Sess, supra note 9, at 38.
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formulation to distinguish between such a claimant and other
claimants who would extend the principle to individual
communities within the coastal State, and to lesser developed
countries, to improve their economies through exclusive or
3
In
preferential access to the living resources off their shoresY.
consequence, the Conference contented itself with a Resolution
recommending:
That where, for the purpose of conservation, it becomes
necessary to limit the total catch of the stock or stocks of fish
in an area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a
coastal State, any other states fishing in that area should
collaborate with the coastal State to secure just treatment of
such situation, by establishing agreed measures which shall
recognize any preferential requirements of the coastal State
resulting from its dependence on the fishery concerned while
having regard to the interests of the other States s
Under the "abstention principle," where a stock of fish is
being fully utilized, is under adequate scientific investigation, and
is under reasonable regulation and control to maintain the
maximum sustainable yield, other nations than those already
fishing the stock will abstain from fishing it. This principle had
been applied to salmon, and a few purely marine species, under
the North Pacific Convention 39 among the United States, Canada
and Japan, in which the Japanese agreed to abstain from fishing
such stocks in the Northeast Pacific. The United States and
Canada at the 1958 Conference proposed, and vigorously argued
in favor of, including this abstention principle 0 in the Convention
on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas. It was not, however adopted, and, when introduced in the
41
form of a resolution, was rejected by the Plenary Meeting.
As we have already noted, the extent of the territorial sea and
37. W.M. Chapman, PROC. THIRD ANN. CONF. LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, 35, 5052 (1969), has briefly summarized the activities at the 1958 Conference concerning this
matter [hereinafter cited as Chapman 1969].
38. 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/L.56 (1958), VI. Special Situations
Relating to Coastal Fisheries.
39. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,

May 9, 1952, inforce June 12, 1953,4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65.
40. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.

13/41 (1958)at 9, 22, 102-04, 109-10, 121-22, 155.
41. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
13/38 (1958) at 47, 109. See also Chapman 1969, supra note 37, at 52.
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exclusive fishing zone remains one of the important unresolved
sources of conflict. The ILC, in the drafts prepared at its Eighth
Session, recognized a zone of the high seas, not extending beyond
twelve miles from the baseline from which is measured the breadth
of the territorial sea, contiguous to its territorial sea, in which the
coastal State may exercise control concerning customs, fiscal or
sanitary regulations. In its commentary 2 it stated explicitly that
it was not willing to recognize any exclusive right of the coastal
State to engage in fishing in the contiguous zone, because it
considered that there was no prospect of an agreement to extend
the exclusive fishing rights of the coastal State beyond the
territorial sea. Nor was the majority of the Commission willing
to accept a claim of the right of the coastal State to take whatever
measures it considered necessary for the conservation of the living
resources.
The breadth of the territorial sea in relation to the breadth
of a possible contiguous fishing zone, both to encompass no more
than twelve miles from the baseline from which the territorial sea
is measured, was widely debated under various formulations at the
1958 Conference, but no agreement was reached. Subsequently, at
a Conference called especially for the purpose in 1960, these
matters were again examined in great detail, but, again, no
agreement could be reached, although there very nearly succeeded
a proposal, advanced by Canada and the United States, for a six
mile territorial sea plus a contiguous fishing zone extending to a
maximum of six more miles, but permitting nations with historic
fishing rights in the outer six miles the opportunity to continue
to fish there for ten years. This proposal was adopted in
Committee by a vote of 43 to 33 with 12 abstentions. It received
additional support when amended by a proposal from Argentina
to give the coastal State, in the high seas adjacent to its exclusive
fishing zone, a preferential right of fishing, especially if its
economic development or the feeding of its population depended
on that activity. This amended proposal failed of adoption by a
single vote.13
42. ILC, 8th Session, supra note 9, at 40.
43. The various proposals at the 1960 Conference, and their treatment, are succinctly
discussed by McDOUGAL & BURKE 1962, supra note 12, at 541-47.
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RECENT PRACTICE AND

POLICY OF NATIONS AND CURRENT

TRENDS

It was intended that the Conventions on the Law of the Sea,
adopted at Geneva in 1958, should provide, so far as possible, a
comprehensive code for the conduct of the international affairs of
nations in the marine realm. With respect to fisheries, the
provisions of the several Conventions, particularly the Convention
on Fishing and the Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, attempt to set forth fundamental principles concerning
the rights and duties of nations on the high seas, to describe and
delimit the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State, and its
special interest in the conservation of living resources off its
shores, to put forth rules and guidelines for unilateral action and
international cooperation to conserve the living resources, and to
-provide a basis for settlement of disputes. As we have seen, this
objective was not fully achieved. Many nations regard the
provisions of the Conventions related to fisheries as unsatisfactory
in one way or another.
In this section I will examine the major provisions of the
1958 Conventions with respect to fisheries, and the recent
practices and apparent policy of nations, especially the United
States, in relation thereto. From this, we may identify the nature
and direction of current trends, and achieve a better appreciation
of likely developments, especially should a new law of the sea
conference be convened in the near future.
Freedom offishing on the high seas
Among the freedoms of the high seas, expressly enumerated
in Article 2 of the Convention on the High Seas, is freedom of
fishing. These freedoms are to be exercised by all States with
reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise
of freedoms of the high seas. The right of fishing is further
amplified in Article 1 of the Convention on Fishing and
Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, wherein
it is stipulated that "all States have the right for their nationals
to engage in fishing on the high seas, subject (a) to their treaty
obligations, (b) to the interests and rights of coastal States as
provided for in this Convention, and (c) to the provisions
contained in the following Articles concerning conservation of the
living resources of the high seas."
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The right of free access of all States to the fisheries of the
high seas is apparently upheld by a large majority of nations, but
the high seas, for fisheries purposes, at least, are tending to shrink.
There are strong pressures for extension of the territorial sea
and/or an exclusive fishing zone, and for extensions of the special
rights of coastal States even beyond such zones. These tend to
limit the region which can be regarded as high seas, where
freedom of access to fisheries, on an equal footing, is open to all.
Further, certain of the living resources that appertain to the
seabed are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State,
and in some locations the seabed under national jurisdiction
extends far out under the overlying high seas. There is also a
strong desire on the part of some nations to add to the resources
of the seabed certain of the demersal species that are presently
regarded as resources of the high seas.
There is also some support for entirely eliminating the
present right of fishing on the high seas by the establishment of a
regime for the living resources of the high seas to be managed by
some international authority, that might have the right to
determine who harvests the fish, to collect revenues from the high
seas fisheries, and to arrange for their disbursement, or
distribution, for the benefit of all nations, but especially the
underdeveloped nations. This tendency is stimulated from two
sources: First, the activities of certain authors and organizations
devoted to the development of world government, who believe that
the oceans are a good place to begin the establishment thereof
and, second, an outgrowth of the current activities toward the
establishment of an international regime for the peaceful uses of
the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, currently
being vigorously pursued in the United Nations.
With respect to the latter, it may be recalled that the General
Assembly in December 1967 established an Ad hoc Committee for
"[e]xamination of the question of the reservation exclusively for
peaceful purposes of the sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of present
national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests
of mankind."'" The General Assembly transformed this Ad hoc
Committee into a Standing Committee the following year.'" This
44. G.A. Res. 2340,22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 44, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
45. G.A. Res. 2467,23 U.N. GAOR Supp. 18, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/7218 (1968).

19701

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Committee has been very active, and has issued several reports46
dealing with the establishment of an outer boundary for national
jurisdiction over the resources of the seabed, and the establishment
of an international regime for the management of the exploration
and exploitation of the deep seabed beyond. It is evident that the
tendency in this Committee, and in the General Assembly as well,
is toward the development of a regime for the peaceful uses of the
deep seafloor involving a new international authority that would
be responsible for the exploration and exploitation of its resources,
would allocate these rights, would collect revenues therefrom, and
would somehow distribute the proceeds to the community of
nations. The Seabeds Committee has confined itself primarily to
the resources of the seabed, and particularly the mineral resources,
except as utilization thereof may interfere with other uses of the
superjacent waters, or may pollute them. However, a few nations
are beginning to advocate extension of such an international
regime for the use of the ocean's resources to the living resources
of the overlying high seas as well. For example, during the debates
concerning the seabed matter in the General Assembly last
autumn, the representative of Guatemala is reported to have said
that the seabed and the superjacent waters are an independent
whole and must be subject to one regime." At the same meeting,
the delegate of Ecuador, in agreeing that a legal regime must be
established for the deep seafloor, also noted that the legal status
of the seabed cannot be separated from that of the superjacent
waters. Thus, apprehension that the jurisdiction of an
international authority for the seabeds might "creep" up through
the superjacent high seas, to include the living resources, may not
be entirely without foundation.
The primary stimulus toward abandoning freedom of the seas
with respect to fisheries in favor of an international authority,
46. See, for example, Report of the ad hoc Committee to Study the Peaceful Uses
of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 23 U.N.
GAOR, U.N. Doc. A]7230 (1968); Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and
the Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Report of the Legal
Subcommittee, 24 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/18 (28 August 1969), and Report
of the Economic and Technical Subcommittee, 24 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC,
138/17 (27 August 1969); and Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Economic and Technical
Subcommittee, Interim Report, 25 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/AC. 138/SC.2/L.6 (26
March 1970).
47. U.N.G.A. First Committee, 1676th Meeting, Press Release GA/PS/1548, (4
November 1969).
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however, appears to be not from governments but from various
influential individuals and private organizations devoted to
promoting world government under the aegis of the United
Nations. Clark Eichelberger, in a recent article advocating the
administration of the bed of the sea by an authority of the United
Nations, makes it quite clear that he and his colleagues believe
this to be but a first step, and that an authority for the sea must
concern itself with other matters, including the high seas
fisheries. 8 The Commission to Study the Organization of Peace
is even more explicit in a recent publication where it is stated:
While this report is directed primarily to the sea-bed, the
Commission is aware that an international regime for the sea
must eventually encompass the world's fisheries and other
marine resources, pollution control, weather control and other
activities. It may be hoped that the establishment, step by step,
of a rational regime for the development, administration and
regulation of the resources of the sea will provide the nations
with a new instrument of international cooperation on a
universal scale much more effective than those developed in
other fields.49
Some others involved in this effort are the World Peace
Through Law Center,5 and Mrs. E.M. Borgese of the Center for
the Study of Democratic Institutions. Mrs. Borgese has reviewed
the proposals of other organizations and individuals, and has
prepared her own rather elaborate draft statute for the peaceful
uses of the high seas and the seabeds beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, that would establish a complex international
authority to regulate, supervise and control all activities on the
high seas, and on or under the seabed, including, inter alia, the
regulation of fisheries, fish-farming and aquaculture.'
Proposals for such an international authority are apparently
quite attractive t.o individuals in small, newly emerging and
underdeveloped countries, with little technical knowledge, because
of their promise of great riches from the sea for the benefit of all
48. Eichelberger, The United Nations and the Bed of the Sea, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
339, 350 (1969).
49. THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE BED OF THE SEA, NINETEENTH REPORT OF THE
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE,

1969, at 29.

50. Treaty Governing the Exploration and Use of the Ocean Bed, Pamphlet Series,
No. 10, WORLD PEACE THROUGH LAW CENTER 1,25 (1968).
51. E.M. Borgese, The Ocean Regime, CENTER FOR STUDY OF DEMOCRATIC
INSTITUTIONS, Occ. Papers 1, !1, 29-31 (October 1968).
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mankind. Not only are the potential benefits greatly exaggerated4,
but some experts, at least, believe that the establishment of an
international authority to administer the resources of the seabed
and the fisheries of the high seas would actually be very
52
detrimental to the development of the underdeveloped countries.
Exclusivejurisdictionof the coastalState
Exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State over living
resources of the adjacent ocean is dealt with, directly or indirectly,
in several of the 1958 Conventions.
The sovereignty of a State over its territorial sea includes, of
course, sovereignty over all aspects of the exploration,
exploitation, and conservation of the living resources therein.
Unfortunately, the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone remains silent on the breadth of the territorial
sea. As we have seen, it was not possible at the Conferences of
either 1958 or 1960 to arrive at an agreed breadth of the territorial
sea, despite the fact that, as the ILC had pointed out, the right
to fix the limit of the territorial sea at least at three miles was not
disputed, and international law did not permit the limit to be
extended beyond twelve miles.5 3 The ILC had expressed the
opinion that the question should be decided by the international
conference.
Similarly, it proved impossible to establish a contiguous
fishing zone extending to twelve miles from the baseline of the
territorial sea, within which the coastal State might exercise
jurisdiction over the living resources. Thus the 1958 Conventions
remain silent on that matter also.
A major impediment to arriving at general agreement about
the breadth of exclusive fisheries jurisdiction, either through
sovereignty over the territorial sea or through jurisdiction over
fisheries in an exclusive fishing zone, at both the 1958 and 1960
Conferences, was the fact that no combination could be developed
that would generally satisfy both the military requirement for
freedom of navigation, through the device of a narrow territorial
sea, and the desire for a zone of at least twelve miles breadth for
52. See, for example, W.M. Chapman, The Ocean Regime of the Real World,
FOURTH ANN. CONF. LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 446,454-55 (1910).

53. ILC, 8th Session, supra note 9, at 13.
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fisheries jurisdiction by the coastal State. This conflict was
perhaps as great within States as between States; for example, the
conflict between coastal fisheries interests and defense interests
was quite evident in the case of the United States.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf, through its
definition of the natural resources of the shelf as including
"sedentary species, that is to say, organisms which, at the
harvestable stage, either are immobile on or under the seabed or
are unable to move except in constant physical contact with the
seabed or the subsoil," 54 also confers exclusive jurisdiction over
that category of fishery resources to the coastal State out to the
limit of its continental shelf.5 Thus, the extent of the seabed
within the limit of national jurisdiction is a matter of interest
from the standpoint of fisheries, as is also the matter of any
possible modification of the definition of just which of the living
resources belong to the sedentary species.
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas deal, by definition, with those
resources beyond the exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State.
However, many species of marine organisms migrate freely
between the area of exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State
(internal waters and the territorial sea) and the adjacent high seas,
so that, for the conservation of these resources, there is required
a degree of cooperation and coordination between the sovereign
of the territorial sea and nations fishing in the adjacent high seas.
This was specifically recognized in the 1958 Fishing Convention
by the provision that, in such a situation, a State whose nationals
are engaged in fishing in the high seas adjacent to the territorial
sea of a coastal State shall not enforce conservation measures
which are opposed to those that have been adopted by the coastal
State, but may enter into negotiations with a view to prescribing
by agreement necessary conservation measures. 5 A resolution of
the 1958 Conference57 also deals with this matter.
54.
55.
limit of
is fully

Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 3, Art. 2, para. 4.
The "continental ghelf" of the Continental Shelf Convention, Art. 1,refers to the
national jurisdiction, and is only remotely related to the geological concept. This
discussed by K. 0. Emery, An Oceanographer's View of the Law of the Sea,

ISTITuTo AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI, SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF THE

(1970), (inpress.)
56. Fishing Convention, supra note 4, Art. 6, para. 4.
57. 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.13/L.56 (1958), IV. Cooperation in
Conservation Measures.
SEA-BED

19701

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

The manifest desire of a large number of nations to extend
their right of exclusive access and control, respecting fisheries, to
a band of adjacent sea at least twelve miles wide is demonstrated
by the recent action of many nations in extending their claims for
territorial seas or fishing limits. From a recent listing of claims,
for breadth of the territorial sea and fishing jurisdiction, of
members of the United Nations System," it may be seen that only
32 nations still adhere to a three mile territorial sea, while 42
claim territorial seas of twelve miles breadth. A few claim
intermediate distances, and extreme claims, beyond twelve miles,
are limited to eight nations, six of them in Latin America. In
addition, Brazil also declared a 200-mile territorial sea on 25
March 1970.1 An even more striking feature of this listing of
claims is that only 16 nations still limit their claims for fisheries
jurisdiction to three miles, while 66 nations now claim twelve
miles. Some dozen nations that claim relatively narrow territorial
seas claim exclusive fishing zones, conservation zones, or other
exclusive jurisdictions over fisheries to distances from 65 to 200
miles.
It seems clear that pressure for extended exclusive fisheries
jurisdiction is much greater than ten years ago, relative to the
counter-pressures of naval interests, and of interests in distantwater fisheries, to maintain narrow territorial seas and narrow
fishery limits. This, of course, is a reason that United States, in
1966, joined those nations claiming a three mile territorial sea and
an additional contiguous fishery zone of nine miles, asserting that
this is now consistent with the practice of the great majority of
nations. It also seems quite evident why the United States might
be willing to go along with the establishment of a twelve-mile
territorial sea, if freedom of navigation of its naval vessels in
international straights were maintained.6" Whether this will prove
possible, or, indeed, whether it will prove possible to limit the
breadth of exclusive fishing zones to only twelve miles, is doubtful.
Although formal claims to broader fisheries jurisdiction are, so
58. Breadth of TerritorialSea and Fishing Jurisdiction Claimed by Members of the
United Nations System. Communication from U.S. State Dep't Office of the Special
Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries & Wildlife, August 15, 1969. See also, Limits and
Status of the TerritorialSea, Exclusive Fishing Zones and the Continental Shelf FAO
FiSH. TECH. PAPER No. 79 (1968).

59. Christian Science Monitor, April 9, 1970, at 4, col. 1.
60. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 4-5, LXII DEP'T STATE BULL. at 341.
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far, few, the pressure for broader exclusive fisheries jurisdiction
may very well continue to increase, so that a two-thirds majority
of nations at a future conference in favor of fixing a definite
twelve-mile fishery limit may become impossible.
It is noteworthy, in this connection, that United States
fisheries interests are strongly divided. Fishermen in the Pacific
Northwest and Alaska, and along our Northeast and Central
Atlantic Coasts, off whose shores large, efficient, foreign, distantwater fishing fleets operate, favor a much broader zone of
exclusive jurisdiction, while the distant-water tuna fishermen
operating from California and Puerto Rico, for example, together
with the distant-water shrimp fishermen of the Southeast Atlantic
and Gulf Coats, are opposed.
The current position of the United States, according to a
recent paper by D.L. McKernan, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State for Fisheries and Wildlife, and his colleague W.
Van Campen,61 is that attempts by coastal States to protect their
fishery interests by unilateral action through extending their
jurisdictional claims beyond twelve miles can hamper full
utilization of fisheries resources, and may lead to retaliatory
actions by distant-water fishing States, with harmful results.
Recourse, therefore, should be had to existing international
mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes, rather than to
unilateral action. On the contrary, other nations, such for example
as Chile, Ecuador and Peru, have proven quite adamant in their
extended unilateral claims, and in refusal to resolve the problem
either by negotiation or through other available international
mechanisms, such as the International Court of Justice.12
The second type of exclusive jurisdiction of the coastal State
over living resources is over the resources of the Continental Shelf.
This is also fraught with potential problems, especially in any new
international negotiations. It may be recalled that there was very
61. McKernan and Van Campen, An Approach to Solving International Fishery
Disputes. Paper presented at Ann. Meeting Am. Fish. Soc., New Orleans, I I Sept. 1969
(TRANS. AM. FiSH. Soc., in press), 2, 23-27 [hereinafter cited as McKernan and Van

Campen].
62. T. Wolf, Peruvian-UnitedStates Relations Over Maritime Fishing: 1945-1969,
LAW OF THE SEA INST., OCC. PAPER No. 4 at 13-20. See also, Hearings on Foreign
Seizures of U.S. Fishing Vessels Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife
Conservation of the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 9th Cong., Ist
Sess., Ser. 90-8, 13, 58-59 (1967).
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extensive debate in the Fourth Committee at the 1958 Conference
concerning just what living resources are resources of the seabed
and subsoil, and what belong to the superjacent high seas.13 Many
delegations were in favor of restricting the definition to those
organisms that are actually within, or physically attached to, the
seabed or subsoil, or live immobile on it, at their harvestable
stages. Others were strongly in favor of including demersal
species, that can swim well above the seabed, but are associated
with it at certain stages of their life histories, such as many socalled "bottom-fishes" and a variety of demersal crustacea,
including shrimps, lobsters, and crabs. Indeed, the opinion was so
nearly divided as to whether or not there should be included in the
definition, as it now appears in the Convention on the Continental
Shelf, 4 a terminal phrase reading "but crustacea and swimming
species are not included," that a vote in the Committee to include
that phrase failed by a tie, 27 for, 27 against and 13 abstentions.6 5
With the recent large growth in tonnage and value of catch, and
expansion to many new areas of the world ocean, of the fisheries
for shrimps and lobsters, not to mention the increasing utilization
of demersal fish on formerly little-exploited continental shelves, it
would not be surprising if, at any new conference, the definition
of the living resources pertaining to the seabed or subsoil were
broadened to include such species. It is, therefore, of some
importance for the United States carefully to consider whether
this would be in its best interests. So far, the United States has
claimed as creatures of the shelf only such mobile crustacea as
king crabs, and tanner crabs that, while they walk about on the
seabed, have not been demonstrated to be capable at their
harvestable stages of swimming in the waters above it.
The question of the limit of national jurisdiction over the
resources of the seabed is also pertinent. Under the Convention on
the Continental Shelf, this extends to at least 200 meters and, in
submarine areas "adjacent to the coast . . ., beyond that limit,
to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the
expoitation of the natural resources .
,,."
There is, however,
63. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doe.
A/Conf. 13/42 (1958) at 27-29, 47-49, 61-62, 69.
64. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 3, Art. 2, para. 4.
65. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 13 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
13-42 (1958) at 70.
66. Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 3, Art. 1.
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considerable debate, both nationally and internationally, as to
how much further offshore, or deeper, the present limit extends
under this definition,67 as well as where it ought to be established
in any new negotiations. 8
Certain organisms, such as king crabs and tanner crabs,
presently coming under the definition of living resources of the
shelf, live in commercial abundance considerably deeper than 200

meters. Some demersal crustacea and fishes extend in commercial
abundance beyond 1,000 meters depth. 9 Thus, it seems impossible
to deal with the matter of exclusive jurisdiction over the living
resources of the continental shelf separately from the definition of

where the national jurisdiction over the seabed ends, and also the
nature of an international regime for the seabed beyond.
67. Some authorities believe that the adjacency criterion extends the potential outer
limit to encompass the entire continental margin, to at least the outer edge of the
continental slope, in depths of some 2000 to 3000 meters; see, e.g., NATIONAL PETROLEUM
COUNCIL, PETROLEUM RESOURCES UNDER THE OCEAN FLOOR 9-10, 55-63 (1969);"
COMMITTEE ON DEEP SEA MINERAL RESOURCES, AMERICAN BRANCH, INTERNATIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATION, INTERIM REPORT, July 19, 1968, at IX-XII; Jennings, The Limits of

ContinentalShelf Jurisdiction:Some Possible Implications of the North Sea Case
Judgment, 18 INT. & COMP. LAW QUARTERLY 819 (1969). Others believe that national
jurisdiction cannot be extended to such depths, including Goldie, The Exploitability
Test-Interpretationand Potentialities,8 NAUTRAL RESOURCES J. 434, 447-48, 452 (1968);
L. Henken, INST. STUDY SCIENCE & HUMAN AFFAIRS, MONOGRAPH 1 (1968) at 24;
Henken, A Reply to Mr. Finlay, 64 AM. JOUR. INT. LAW 42, 62-72 (1970); both of these
authors assert that, in any event, the extent of national jurisdiction ought to be much more
limited, and that the Continental Shelf Convention should be revised to make this explicit.
S. Oda, Proposalsfor Revising the Convention on the Continental Shelf, 7 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 3-10, 30 (1968), on the contrary, believes that, by a literal interpretation
of the Convention, the entire bed of the oceans is subject to national jurisdictions, and that
it will require a revision of the Convention to make the limits more restrictive.
68. THE COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR
NATION AND THE SEA 143-56, advocates redefinition to limit each nation's jurisdiction to
200 meters depth, or 50 miles offshore, whichever encompasses the greater area, and
recommends that there be negotiated a new regime for the deep sea floor beyond, including
an intermediate zone out to 2,500 meters depth or 100 miles offshore, in which the coastal
State would control access to the resources under terms established, in part, by an
international authority. This international authority would also be responsible for the
control of exploration and exploitation of the resources of the deep sea floor, beyond the
intermediate zone. Similar proposals have been discussed in the Seabeds Committee of the
General Assembly (see note 46 supra). The National Petroleum Council is strongly
opposed to new arrangements that would further limit national jurisdiction over the
resources of the continental margin, and to an international authority with such extensive
powers as proposed by the Commission. NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, PETROLEUM
RESOURCES UNDER THE OCEAN FLOOR, 11, 13, 69-78 (1969).

69. Schaefer, Living Resources of the Sea-bed, ISTITUTo AFFARI INTERNAZIONALI,
SYMPOSIUM ON THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF THE SEA-BED (1970) (inpress.)
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As of this writing, although the United States recognizes that
there is a portion of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, and
is in favor of setting a precise boundary as soon as practicable,
as well as establishing an equitable international regime for the
deep seafloor, 0 it has not yet adopted any official position as to
where the outer limit of national jurisdiction should be
established. There is involved in arriving at such a position an
extremely complex interaction of military interests, fisheries
interests, petroleum interests, and interests concerned with other
minerals of the seafloor.
It seems quite certain that at any new conference it will be
impossible to avoid reconsideration of all the matters concerning
the living resources in any way related to the seabottom adjacent
to the continents.
So far as concerns species that move between waters clearly
under national jurisdiction, such as the territorial sea or the
contiguous exclusive fishing zone, and offshore waters of the high
seas, the general practice of the United States has evidently been
to arrive at suitable accommodations among the various users by
negotiation, bringing to bear not only the conservation principles
of the 1958 Convention, and regional conventions in the specific
areas of concern, but also such economic and political
considerations as may be pertinent. McKernan and Van Campen
have explicitly stated that, in the case of conflict of economic
interests where coastal fishermen and distant-water fishermen are
utilizing the same resource, there exist mechanisms for resolving
such conflicts by negotiation, with proper consideration for the
interests of both parties. 7' However, it appears that not all nations
are willing to rely on this sort of mechanism; some prefer to
protect their interests by extension of their exclusive fisheries
jurisdictions, or at least by demanding special rights in the high
seas, often in very broad regions thereof, adjacent to their shores,
70. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 5-6, 7, LXII DEP'T STATE BULL. at 341-43. See also
statement of Ambassador C. Phillips in the Seabeds Committee of the General Assembly
on March 26, 1970, U.S. Mission to the United Nations Press Release USUN-43(70).
However, on May 23, 1970, President Nixon released to the press a statement on U.S.
ocean policy proposing that all nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty under which
they would renounce all claims to the natural resources of the seabed beyond 200 meters
depth, and proposing an international regime for the seabed beyond; he said that the U.S.
will introduce specific proposals at the next meeting of the U.N. Seabed Committee.
71. McKernan and Van Campen, supra note 61, at 2, 11-16.
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not only for conservation purposes but also to obtain a
preferential share of the harvest.
Related to the foregoing is the "abstention principle," at
least as it applies to salmon and North Pacific herring, both of
which reproduce and are fished in waters under national
jurisdiction but also migrate extensively to the high seas beyond,
where they may be subject to commercial fishery. This principle,
as we have noted, was rejected at the 1958 Conference, but it
continues to be applied under the provisions of the North Pacific
Convention among Japan, Canada, and the United States." With
respect to salmon, under a treaty between Japan and the USSR,
concerning conservation of fisheries in the Northwest Pacific,
decisions on allocations of catch of salmon between the two
parties are arrived at by negotiation each year.73 The abstention
principle, as advocated by the United States and Canada at the
1958 Conference is, in general, applicable to purely marine
species, so that this appears to be a type of exclusive access to
high seas resources by those States already using them, where the
full harvest is already being obtained, and the stocks are under
scientific investigation and suitable conservation management.
Conservation of living resources of the high seas, and the special
interests of the coastalState
The Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas in Article 2 defines conservation in
terms of maintaining the fish stocks so as to render possible the
maximum sustainable yield. By Articles 3 and 4, it imposes on
fishing nations the duty individually and collectively to adopt
measures for conserving the living resources fished by their
nationals. Articles 6 and 7 accord extensive special rights to
coastal States. Under Article 6, the coastal State is entitled to
take part on an equal footing in any system of research and
regulation for purposes of conservation of the living resources of
the high seas adjacent to its territorial sea, even though its
nationals do not carry on fishing there. This article further
accords priority to the conservation regulations established by the
72. International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean,
May 9, 1952, in force June 12, 1953,4 U.S.T. 380, T.I.A.S. No. 2786, 205 U.N.T.S. 65.
73. McDOUGAL & BURKE 1962, supra note 12, at 955. See also The Management of
Fishery Resources, F.A.O., Rome (1967) at 28.

19701

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

coastal State, and requires other States to negotiate with it
concerning measures for the conservation of the living resources
of the high seas in that area. Article 7 goes even further, giving
the coastal State the right, following failure of negotiation with
other States, to impose unilateral measures of conservation in any
area of the high seas. adjacent to its territorial sea where there can
be made a showing of urgency, an appropriate scientific basis, and
nondiscrimination against foreign fishermen.
As we have already noted, these extensive rights of regulation
of the fisheries on the high seas by the coastal State, flowing from
its special interests in the conservation of the fishery resources off
its shores, could easily be subject to abuse, giving rise to the
necessity for adopting, in detail, a rapid and effective mechanism
for adjudication of disputes. Consequently, Articles 9 through 12
of the Convention stipulate in detail a mechanism for settlement
of disputes, in the first instance by negotiation, and, failing that,
by compulsory arbitration. Dispute-settlement aspects of the
Convention will be discussed below under the appropriate heading.
This Convention provides a quite adequate basis for
conservation of the living resources of the high seas, through
cooperation of the fishing nations and of the adjacent coastal
States. As envisaged by the Rome Conference of 1955, several
additional intergovernmental fisheries bodies have been
established under multilateral conventions, and other agreements
among interested States, since 1958, for the purpose of collecting
the necessary scientific information, and providing means of
cooperation in the conservation management of specific resources
or all of the fisheries resources of a particular region. 74 The 1958
Convention certainly provides an adequate basis for the coastal
State to exercise its special interests in the conservation of the
living resources of the high seas off its shores.
Yet this Convention is widely regarded as being quite
inadequate. The difficulty, as we have already observed, is that
many nations, both coastal States and those with distant-water
fisheries, are interested in a great deal more than conservation.
They are at least equally interested in who gets the fish. Thus,
there continues to be considerable pressure for allocation of
74. The Management of Fisheries Resources, F.A.O., Rome (1967), Annex Table 16,
provides information on 21 intergovernmental fisheries bodies, of which 5 were established
subsequent to 1958.
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access, in those cases where the maximum sustainable yield has
been attained, through fixed catch-quotas within that limit,
among nations engaged in the fishery, 5 or by other means.
Preferentialfishing rights of coastalStates
The problem of equitably accommodating claims to
preference in the harvesting of high-seas fishery resources, based
on economic needs of coastal States, originally elucidated
especially by Iceland, 76 remains unsolved. In connection with this
topic the speech of John Stevenson contained the statement that:
Many nations do not believe that mere conservation of...
fisheries adequately protects their interests. . . . We believe
. ..economic pressures have contributed significantly to the
trend toward expanded unilateral jurisdictional claims and that
many nations will insist that these problems be dealt with in
conjunction with agreement on the breadth of the territorial
sea.77
Certainly the United States is among the nations maintaining
that the interests of coastal States in the resources of the high seas
off their coasts extend beyond conservation to encompass also
economic interests. This has been explicitly stated by McKernan
and Van Campen,7 s who also apparently believe that this is a
critical matter for underdeveloped nations, since they say:
"Unless ways can be found to give the developing countries
confidence on this point, we are likely to see a continuing erosion
of the freedom to fish in many parts of the world." 7 9 At a recent
panel discussion, Ambassador Anderson of Iceland indicated that
the 1958 Conventions do not satisfy the special economic needs
75.

THE COMMISSION ON MARINE SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES,

OUR

NATION AND THE SEA 105-109 (1969) strongly advocates, for example, a system of national

catch-quotas among all nations operating in the cod and haddock fisheries of the North
Atlantic, and also commends to early consideration a system of national catch-quotas for
the North Pacific Fisheries. It recognizes, however, the difficulties of accommodating the

preferential rights of coastal States, in the general case. See also J.Crutchfield, National
Quotasfor the North Atlantic Fisheries:An Exercise in Second Best, PROC. THIRD ANN.
CONF. LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE

263 (1969), and also McKernan and Van Campen,

supra note 61, at 8.
76. Conference Official Records, supra note 14, at 87-89, and Chapman 1969, supra
note 37, at 50-52.
77. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 4-5, LXI I DEP'T STATE BULL. at 34 1.
78. McKernan and Van Campen, supra note 61, at 14, 16.
79. Id. at 14.
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of his country8 Ambassador Oribe of Uruguay in the same
discussions clearly indicated that the question of the special
interests of the coastal States concerning fisheries were not solved
from the viewpoint of the interests and aspirations of the Latin
American countries. Indeed, Ambassador Oribe advocated, with
respect to the resources of the sea, that we should abandon the
universalistic approach in favor of a regional approach. 8'
Canada is another example of a nation insisting on extending
the concept of the special interests of the coastal State in the living
resources of the high seas, beyond conservation. In a recent
speech, J. Davis, Minister of Fisheries and Forestry, pointed out
that Canada has increased its exclusive fishery jurisdiction by
adopting a twelve-mile fishing zone, and is committed to a policy
of further enlarging this by measuring the zone from baselines
drawn between headlands.12 Baselines had already been established
on the east coast of Newfoundland and Labrador, and the
Minister announced the intention to take similar action in other
coastal regions as soon as possible. He indicated, however, that
this was still inadequate, and that there needs to be defined the
extent of the interests of the coastal State in the fisheries even
further off its coasts, "not only for purposes of conservation but
for management as well," and went on to say that the coastal
State ought to be assigned the major responsibility for the
management of fisheries over its continental shelf.8
The question of preferential fishing rights of coastal States,
not covered by the 1958 Convention, is likely to be of critical
importance at any new conference. The preceding discussions
indicate pressures for some recognition of preferential rights of
coastal States, based on economic considerations, to the harvest
of the living resources of the high seas adjacent to their territorial
seas or contiguous fishing zones. It is not evident, however, what
sort of provisions in a new convention on the law of the sea could
achieve this result in a manner to command the assent of twothirds of the nations present and voting.
80. The Geneva Convention: Ten Years Later, PROC. THIRD ANN. CONF. LAW OF
72-78 (1969).
81. Id. at 70-71.
82. J. Davis, Address at the Boston Fish Expo, Oct. 16-19, 1968, manuscript
distributed by Information Branch, Dep't of Fisheries (1968) at 2-3.
83. Id. at 4.
THE SEA INSTITUTE
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One way of obtaining preferential fishing rights over a
greater breadth of the high seas off a nation's shores is extension
of its claims to unilateral jurisdiction. This is undoubtedly a
major motivation for extension of the territorial sea in some
instances, and the establishment of exclusive fishing zones in
others. Certainly this is the major factor in the 200-mile claims
of a few nations. Similar results may be achieved by adopting
methods of drawing baselines extending both the territorial sea
and exclusive fishing zones further offshore than they would have
gone otherwise, as was done, for example, by Iceland in 195084

and by Canada more recently."'
Another method, that seems to be preferred by the United
States, for example, is to achieve recognition of certain
preferential rights, based on economic considerations, by means
of multilateral or bilateral negotiations with other countries
engaged in the fishery on the high seas in the area of concern.
In order to establish a factual, scientific, biological basis for
such negotiations, it is highly desirable to obtain the required data
through the cooperative efforts of the various countries fishing in
the area. This may be achieved, as in the case of the Northwest
Atlantic, by means of an international commission representing
all, or nearly all, countries fishing there.86 Similarly, in the
Northeast Pacific this role of fact finding is fulfilled primarily by
the North Pacific Commission, among Canada, Japan and the
United States, also relying on the findings of already-existing
specialized commissions concerned with halibut, 7 and with the
salmon of the Fraser River."
However, bilateral cooperation in investigations, outside the
framework of a formal convention, can also be effective. Whereas
84. B.

U.S.

MCCHESNEY,

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATION AND DOCUMENTS

1956, LI

466-67 (1957).

85. J. Davis, Address at the Boston Fish Expo, Oct. 16-19, 1968, manuscript
distributed by Information Branch, Dep't of Fisheries (1968) at 2-3.
86. International Convention for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, 8 Feb. 1949, In
force for United States July 3, 1950, I U.S.T. 477, T.I.A.S. No. 2089, 157 U.N.T.S. 157.
87. Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of the Northern Pacific
Ocean and Bering Sea, March 2, 1953, 5 U.S.T. 5, T.I.A.S. No. 2900, 222 U.N.T.S. 77.
(Replaces the earlier Conventions of 1924 and 1937).
88. Convention for the Protection, Preservation, and Extension of the Sockeye
Salmon Fishery of the Fraser River System, in force 28 July, 1937, 50 Stat. 1355, T.S.
918; and Protocol amending the Convention to include pink salmon, in force 3 July 1957,
8 U.S.T. 1057, T.I.A.S. No. 3867, 290 U.N.T.S. 103.

1970]

SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

in the Northwest Atlantic close cooperation between the U.S. and
U.S.S.R. in scientific investigations of the fisheries resources is
carried out through mechanisms related to the Northwest Atlantic
Fisheries Commission, in the Northeast Pacific, where the
U.S.S.R. is not a party to the North Pacific Convention, such
research has been effectively arranged on a less formal, bilateral
basis, involving the scientists and research vessels of the fisheries
agencies of the two countries.89
On the basis of scientific findings concerning the biological
aspects of the resources of concern, the nations may then enter
into pragmatic practical negotiations taking into account all
pertinent economic aspects, and various political factors as well.
This sort of negotiated practical solution has been of value in
resolution of problems of the United States in both the North
Pacific and North Atlantic Oceans.
In the case of the Pacific, the United States has maintained
preferential fishing rights, through the abstention principle, to
salmon and some other species, by means of the North Pacific
Convention. It is noteworthy that, although Japan has at various
times objected to this Convention, on the basis that it was
negotiated at a period, immediately after the War, when she was
at a disadvantage in such negotiations, she has continued to
adhere to the Convention despite the opportunity to withdraw
from and thus terminate it, since 1963.9 o Under executive
agreements between the United States and Japan,91 Japan has
agreed to refrain from fishing with certain types of gear in
specified areas of the high seas near the United States during
specified seasons, and, at the same time, has received permission
of the United States to use specified areas of its exclusive fishing
zone for certain fishery-connected loading and unloading
operations of its vessels. A similar executive agreement is also
89. A formal basis for this cooperative fisheries research, that is carried out not only
on the high seas, but in the contiguous fishing zone of the U.S. as well, is a series of

Executive Agreements, the most recent being Northeastern Part of the Pacific Ocean off
the United States Coast, Agreement with the U.S.S.R., amending and extending the
Agreement of February 13. 1967, as amended and extended, Jan. 31, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 340,
T.I.A.S. No. 6636.
90. Art. II, para. 2, provides that the treaty will continue in force for ten years, after
which it will be terminated as to all contracting parties one year after notice of withdrawl

of a contracting party.
91. Certain Fisheries Off the United States Coast, Salmon Fisheries, Agreements with
Japan, December 23, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7632, T.I.A.S. No. 6600.
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effective between the U.S. and U.S.S.R.92 in the North Pacific;
vessels of the Soviet Union are permitted to carry out certain
fishing and loading operations in specified areas of the United
States' contiguous fishing zone, and agree to refrain from, or
restrict, fishing operations using specified types of gear in given
areas of the high seas.
On the Atlantic, an executive agreement has been negotiated
between the United States and the U.S.S.R.93 under which the
nations agree to cooperative scientific research and exchanges of
scientific and statistical data, and agree to fishing regulations in
specified areas of the high seas, during specified seasons, that
result in preferential fishing rights of U.S. fishermen to particular
species; fishing vessels of the U.S.S.R. are accorded the right to
fish in specified areas and seasons in the United States'
contiguous fishing zone, and to carry out loading and unloading
operations in specified waters of that zone and of the territorial
sea. A similar agreement has quite recently been negotiated
between the United States and Poland.9 4
McKernan has pointed out that such executive agreements
have been quite successful in solving the limited set of problems
with which they deal, in four ways: (1) Resolution of differences
in jurisdictions; (2) Arrangements for joint research and
conservation programs; (3) Limiting foreign fishing, to some
degree, in waters off our coasts; (4) Reduction of conflicts between
different types of fishing gear.95
He notes, however, that these executive agreements suffer
from being limited in time and subject matter, and in being not
necessarily reflective of broad public opinion. He regards the
bilateral and multilateral conventions as superior, but he observes
that they also have limitations in the world ahead, because,, when
a large number of nations begin fishing the resources rather than
just two, three or four, the situation becomes complicated simply
because of the number of people and nations involved, and the
92. See note 89 supra.
93. Agreement with the U.S.S.R. on Certain Fishery Problems on the High Seas in
the Western Areas of the Middle Atlantic Ocean, December 13, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7661,
T.I.A.S. No. 6603.
94. Fisheries in the Western Region of the Middle Atlantic Oceon, Agreement with
Poland, June 12, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 884, T.I.A.S. No. 6704.
95. D. McKernan, International Fisheries Arrangements Beyond the Twelve Mile
Limit, PROC. THIRD ANN. CONF. LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE 255, 256 (1969).
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differences in the way they deal with administrative problems."
He has, therefore, advocated a future regime involving an
international treaty, or other arrangement, that gives preference to
coastal States over resources off their coasts, although, at the
same time, providing for the existing interests and investments97 of
distant-water fishing States and for limited entry of newcomers.
McKernan and Van Campen have also observed that it would
be best if such problems could be solved by reference to a set of
universally accepted principles and rules governing the relation of
nations and their common use of ocean resources, but that this
degree of unanimity among nations has not yet been achieved.
Meanwhile, they note, it is possible for the nations to work out
by negotiation practical solutions that protect the interests and
legal positions of all parties. 8
Unfortunately, solution of problems arising from claims of
coastal States to preferential fishing rights on the adjacent high
seas can only be solved by negotiation and cooperation if the
parties concerned are willing to negotiate and cooperate. In the
event that this condition is not met, the procedure becomes
ineffective, and the problem is solvable only by the use of force,
military or economic. An outstanding case of such an impasse is
the problem concerning fishing on the high seas involving the
United States on the one side and Chile, Peru, and Ecuador on
the other.9 The three Latin American nations have for many years
asserted the right to regulate the fisheries off their shores to a
distance of 200 miles, including the levying of expensive license
fees on foreign fishing vessels, which claim has been strongly
opposed by the United States whose flag vessels operate
extensively in this region in the tuna fisheries. Despite the threat
of economic sanctions, and the suspension by the United States
of certain types of military assistance to Peru, it has not yet
proven possible to resolve this problem by negotiation, as we have
already discussed. Special negotiations were recently undertaken
with Peru in the hope of resolving the problem by means of some
sort of bilateral agreement, perhaps similar to the executive
agreements in the North Atlantic and North Pacific already
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 257.
Id. at 259-60.
McKernan and Van Campen, supra note 61, at 27.
See note 62 supra.
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referred to, but have been unsuccessful. The most recent
conference among the four governments was held in August 1969
at Buenos Aires. None of the parties were willing to alter their
positions. Indeed, the delegate from Peru indicated that the three
Latin American nations were cohesive in their firm decision "to
maintain inalterable, without even a debate, the juridical positions
of the parties."0° The only result was an agreement to meet again,
during the same year, at Bueno Aires; 01' to date, the meeting has
not been resumed.
Another example of possible failure of negotiations is the
current threat of entry by Korea into the salmon fisheries of the
Northeast Pacific. It is reported that Korean fishermen, without
the consent of their government, actually engaged in these fisheries
in 1969, and that there are plans for extensive operations during
the summer of 1970.102 This has caused a strong reaction on the
part of the members of the North Pacific Convention,' 03 since it
could cause severe disruption to the somewhat delicate
arrangements for preferential rights in the salmon fishery in the
entire North Pacific.
In view of the evident demand for recognition of some sort
of preferential rights of fishing of coastal States in the adjacent
high seas, it would obviously be highly desirable at any new
conference to establish some international rules and guidelines for
determining such preferences. McDougal and Burke chide the
1958 Conference, and the International Law Commission before
it; in not attempting this ambitious task." 4 However, as we have
already discussed, there appears to be no adequate basis for
100. Conference Among Chile, Ecuador, Peru and the United States on Fisheries,
Second Plenary Meeting, CONPES/DOC. 24 (1969) at 5.
101. Joint Declaration at the End of the First Period of Sessions, CONPES/DOC,
22 (1969).
102. National Fisherman, November 1969, at 2-A, Col. 4; January 1970, at 2-A, Col.
5; February 1970, at 15-A, Col. 1.
103. National Canners Association, Fishery Information Bulletin, November 14,

1969, reported that the North Pacific Commission at the final Plenary Session of its
Sixteenth Annual Meeting on November 7, 1969
took note with grave apprehension of reports that the Republic of Korea,

which is not a member of the Commission, engaged in fisheries of salmon in
the eastern Bering Sea during 1969 and agreed to request that the member
Governments-Canada, Japan and the United States-take appropriate
measures to deter any such operations in the Convention area which will
impair the achievement of the conservation objectives of the Convention.
104. McDoUGAL & BURKE 1962, supra note 12, at 1006.
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distinguishing cases of real economic necessity from claims of
economic necessity that may have little merit. It is not evident
that the obstacles to resolving this problem that existed in Geneva
in 1958 have been in any way diminished and, indeed, with the
creation of a great many more coastal States, all of whom in one
way or another are likely to regard themselves as being in a
"special situation," the problem is likely to be even more difficult
the next time around.
Settlement of disputes
Some effective and efficient means of settlement of disputes
is obviously an essential element in any international legal regime
for the utilization and conservation of the living resources of the
high seas. Where, as in the case of the 1958 Convention on
Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High
Seas, there are granted new rights and privileges, and imposed
new duties, where these did not before exist, it is particularly
necessary to have agreed-upon, effective means for settlement of
disputes.
It is, of course, preferable to handle disputes through
negotiation, voluntary arbitration, or submission to a competent
court, such as the International Court of Justice. However, when
these means fail it is necessary to have some effective compulsory
means of settlement. It was for this reason, as we have seen, there
were adopted Articles 9 through 12 of the Convention on Fishing
and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas, as
an essential component of the international law setting forth new
rights and duties of nations, and particularly coastal States, with
respect of the living resources of the high seas.
Just how well this system of compulsory arbitration would
work we do not know, because it has not been tried. As we have
seen, a good many nations have not acceeded to this Convention
because they object to compulsory arbitration, and, in the case of
the few fisheries disputes among those nations adhering to the
Convention, this machinery has not been called into action.
At any new conference on the law of the sea, there will
certainly arise the question of additional preferential fishing rights
of coastal States. Provisions of an agreement on that subject
could lead to even more conflicts than are likely to arise under
the provisions of the 1958 Convention respecting conservation of
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the living resources of the high seas. The matter of adjudication
of disputes is, therefore, certain to become of even greater
importance than it was in 1958.
There are three possible results of a reconsideration of means
for settlement of disputes concerning conservation and utilization
of the living resources of the high seas. First, there might be
adopted some compulsory arbitration procedure similar to that
set forth in the existing Convention. Second, there might be a
reversion to the original proposal of the International Law
Commission to establish an international authority, within the
framework of the United Nations, competent to prescribe
regulations of fisheries binding upon all States-parties to a new
con ention. 115 Therd seems to be a considerable tendency toward
accepting such a solution for the resources of the deep seabed
beyond national jurisdiction, and it is possible that, with the
greatly changed composition of the United Nations, such a
solution for the high seas fisheries would receive wider support
than it did in 1958. The third alternative, that in my view is the
most likely, is that no agreement can be reached on any
mechanism for compulsory settlement of disputes. If compulsory
arbitration were acceptable, I believe that a great many more
nations would adhere to the existing Convention and employ its
provisions. Likewise, there is little evidence that any large number
of fishing nations (nearly all coastal States are to some extent
fishing nations) are enthusiastic about a supra-national authority.
Conclusionsand Outlook
The foregoing review indicates that at any new conference on
the law of the sea there will certainly be subjected to
reexamination a good many of the provisions related to fisheries
already adopted in the 1958 Conventions, including, at least, the
following: the outer limit of national jurisdiction over the
resources of the seabed (continental shelf); definition of the living
resources appertaining to the continental shelf; the definition of
"conservation;" the nature of the special rights of the coastal
State in conservation of living resources in the contiguous high
seas; the rights and duties of distant-water fishing nations; and
means of settlement of disputes over conservation matters and
over rights of fishing.
105. Int'l L. Comm'n, Report, 8 U.N. GAOR Supp. 9, at 17, U.N. Doc. A/2456

(1953).
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It thus seems highly unlikely that at the proposed new
conference it will be possible, as suggested by Mr. Stevenson, to
avoid "[r]eopening the questions settled by the 1958 conventions
[which] would cause needless confusion and delay."1 ' While one
can appreciate his desire, in the interest of rapid progress, to
confine the issues to only a few of the important questions that
remained unsettled at the 1958 and 1960 Conferences, such hope
seems doomed to disappointment.
The outlook, therefore, especially in view of the fact that the
General Assembly has the bit in its teeth, is for the convening,
within the next few years, of a new conference on the law of the
sea that will, so far as living resources are concerned, reconsider
everything adopted at the 1958 Conference, as well as the
unresolved issues discussed above, and perhaps additional issues
which have not yet occurred to us.
106. Stevenson, supra note 7, at 6, LXII

DEP'T STATE BULL.

at 342.

